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COLD COMFORT AND A PAPER TIGER: THE 
(UN)AVAILABILITY OF TORT COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Iran destroyed my life! I want justice! As an American citizen, I 
should be entitled to my day in court.”1 Those dramatic words were the 
plea that former hostage David Jacobsen included in the statement he 
submitted to the United States Senate when it was considering creating a 
civil cause of action for private citizens against foreign governments for 
damages arising out of acts of terrorism.2 In support of the same 
amendment, Jacobsen’s son wrote President Clinton a letter arguing that 
the culpability of terrorist-sponsoring states should be determined by the 
courts “on the basis of law and evidence, not [by] the State Department on 
the basis of diplomatic convenience.”3 Convinced that they are entitled to 
have their day in an American court and confident that litigation will deter 
future acts of terrorism, American victims of international terrorism like 
David Jacobsen and their families have sought to have their traumatic 
ordeals compensated for in the American court system.4 Instead, they have 
found themselves with empty victories—the cold comfort of 
 1. Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts: Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice, Hearing on 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity (sic) Act, 103d Cong. 60 (1994) (statement by David P. Jacobsen 
offered at the Hearing on the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1993 to Amend Title 28 of the 
United States Code) (available at 1994 WL 274223 (F.D.C.H.)) (emphasis added).
 2. Id. Jacobsen’s written statement was submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Courts and 
Administrative Practice when that subcommittee was considering an amendment to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Id. The proposed amendment (which ultimately passed) provides 
a civil cause of action against nation-states who sponsor terrorism, and abrogates those states’ 
sovereign immunity in order to make the cause of action enforceable. Id. 
 3. Id. Letter from Eric D. Jacobsen, son of David Jacobsen, to President William Clinton (May 
2, 1994), reprinted in id. at 61. 
 4. In a December 14, 2002 editorial to the Washington Post, Allan Gerson, co-counsel for a 
group of over 3,000 family members of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and counsel in other 
lawsuits against foreign governments arising out of terrorist acts, wrote that “[b]y making foreign 
sponsors of terrorism pay a heavy price for their misdeeds, the families of victims of terrorism hope to 
spare other Americans the pain they have endured.” Allan Gerson, Editorial, Terrorists’ Sponsors 
Must Pay, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2002, at A24. Victims and their families often believe that their suits 
are a form of retribution, both securing justice and preventing the occurrence of future terrorist acts. 
See infra notes 99–106. 
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unenforceable judgments and only an ineffectively deterrent paper tiger to 
wave at the governments of foreign states.5
To their initial satisfaction, the amendment sought by Mr. Jacobsen and 
other victims passed the House and Senate and was enacted in 1996 as part 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).6 
However, it has failed to achieve the compensation and deterrence results 
its supporters expected. Although the victims of terrorism have had some 
success in obtaining judgments against states who sponsor terrorism, 
efforts to recover the monetary damages awarded have repeatedly failed.7 
The interplay between the compensation and deterrence goals of judiciary 
tort law and the foreign relations power of the political branches of 
government has rendered cases under the AEDPA and other legislation 
toothless.8  
This interplay is the result of political and diplomatic maneuvering. 
The state of American law regarding the civil liability of foreign states for 
acts of terrorism has become a tug-of-war contest between two competing 
interests: The judicial interest in compensating plaintiff-victims and 
deterring future acts of terrorism, and the foreign relations interest in 
preserving and maintaining American diplomatic relations with nations in 
an increasingly tenuous international atmosphere.9 In this struggle, the 
three branches of the federal government have gone in separate and 
sometimes conflicting directions.10 Even as the judicial branch awards 
significant compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiffs in cases 
 5. The paper tiger to which this Note refers is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”), discussed infra notes 6, 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 6. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) 
(codified as amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000)), 
discussed in more detail infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 7. Allison Taylor, Another Front in the War on Terrorism? Problems with Recent Changes to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 539 (2003). At the time Taylor’s article 
was published, Iran, Iraq, Cuba, and Libya collectively owed hundreds of millions of dollars to 
plaintiffs from more than twenty lawsuits brought under the AEDPA. Id. For more detail on specific 
judgments and unpaid damage awards, see Kristine Cordier, Annotation, Award of Damages Under 
State-sponsored Terrorism Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1605(a)(7)), 182 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002). 
 8. W. Michael Reisman & Monica Hakimi, 2001 HUGO BLACK LECTURE: Illusion and 
Reality in the Compensation of Victims of International Terrorism, 54 ALA. L. REV. 561, 573 (2003). 
The authors discuss cases under the AEDPA as “exercises of judicial therapy for the families of 
victims,” and say that “the decisions had an eerie, autistic national character; their effects remained 
largely within the United States and were never tested against international law—because, from the 
standpoint of international law, in the absence of execution of judgment, nothing was happening.” Id. 
 9. See infra notes 112–25 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 112–25 and accompanying text. 
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against states that sponsor terrorism,11 the executive branch continues to 
attempt to restrict attachment of foreign assets and limit the enforcement 
of the judgments awarded by the judiciary.12 Meanwhile, the legislative 
branch treads a fine line between responding to voter demands for tort 
compensation and maintaining the international responsibilities dictated by 
the foreign relations power granted to it by the United States 
Constitution.13
This Note examines the effectiveness and advisability of civil actions 
against foreign governments that sponsor terrorism, and argues that the 
conflict between tort law and foreign relations has: (1) created false hopes 
for plaintiffs seeking compensation through civil action,14 (2) failed to 
deter future terrorist action,15 and (3) tied the hands of the political 
branches with regard to the diplomatic relations of the United States.16 As 
such, the cause of action and exception to sovereign immunity contained 
in the AEDPA, the Flatow amendment, and successive amendments 
should be abrogated. This Note concludes by calling for legislative 
consideration of an alternative compensation scheme, in the vein of a 
flexible but regularly-funded federal program similar to the fund created to 
compensate victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Part II of this Note discusses the history of the American doctrine of 
sovereign immunity and the development of the exception for state-
sponsored acts of terrorism.17 Part III briefly surveys the alternative 
 11. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, A Case of Terrorism: How Two Lawyers Brought a Suit They Just 
Might Win, 24 NAT’L. L.J., No. 60, Nov. 11, 2002, at A1. While the figures given for currently 
outstanding monetary judgments vary, awards are undoubtedly in the cumulative billions and have 
been significant enough to inspire two lawyers to file a more than $1 trillion suit on behalf of more 
than 3,000 family members against the government of Saudi Arabia arising out of the events of 
September 11, 2001. Id. 
 12. See Bill Miller, Albright Seeks Ways to Help Terror Victims Collect Damages, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 17, 2000, at A6 (discussing the Administration’s effort to satisfy plaintiff’s demands while 
preventing attachment of assets and citing former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: “the 
challenge is to help the families [of victims] ‘in some way that does not harm our overall foreign 
policy interests.’ [Albright] said U.S. officials want to be careful ‘not to undercut our international 
obligations.’”). 
 13. The grant of foreign relations power to the political branches in the United States 
Constitution is found in Article I, section 8 for powers granted to the Legislature and Article II, section 
2 for powers granted to the President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, 11; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
See also H.R. REP. 106-733, at 5 (2000), as an example of Congress’ current attitude towards personal 
civil suits against terrorist states (“the President’s continued use of his waiver power [to waive 
attachment of assets for use in satisfying judgments] has frustrated the legitimate rights of victims of 
terrorism.”). 
 14. See infra notes 99–106 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 112–23 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 21–87 and accompanying text. 
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compensation fund program developed for the victims of the September 
11th terrorist attacks.18 Part IV addresses the compensation, deterrence, 
and separation of powers problems with the law as it currently exists,19 
and suggests that a fund program similar to the September 11th 
compensation fund should be considered as a model on which to base 
further discussion of alternative compensation schemes for the victims of 
future terrorist attacks, in place of the current availability of civil suits.20
II. HISTORY 
Over a century ago, the United States and most other internationally-
active countries granted broad sovereign immunity from actions within 
their domestic court systems to the governments of other nation-states.21 
Initially, this policy of sovereign immunity was nearly absolute, though it 
has been gradually eroded over the years.22 The original broad-reaching 
sovereign immunity was first modified in 1952 with the adoption of the 
“restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity advocated in the Tate Letter.23 
Under this restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, private and 
commercial acts of a foreign state are not protected from civil suits in 
American courts.24 Modern American sovereign immunity is still loosely 
based on the restrictive theory but has been eroded to provide less 
 18. See infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 95–123 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 20–21 (1963), stating that broad sovereign immunity existed generally for 
states until the turn of the century, with the exception of the category of cases described in The 
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). In The Schooner Exchange, the 
Court first stated that general principles of international law and territorial sovereignty supported a 
doctrine of sovereign immunity and cited the United States’ executive branch’s support for the 
doctrine before establishing that the French naval vessel in question was outside the jurisdiction of 
American courts. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 122, 132–35. As the Court stated, “justice is to be administered 
with a due regard to the law of nations, and to the rights of other sovereigns.” Id. at 123. 
 22. See, e.g., SWEENEY, supra note 21, at 20–21. 
 23. Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, to Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 
19, 1952) (reprinted in 26 Dep’t. St. Bull. 984 (1952)) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; also reprinted in 
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 202, 208 (3d ed. 
1996). The Tate Letter stated that: “widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of 
engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing 
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.” Id. 
 24. For a general discussion of the historical development of the American sovereign immunity 
doctrine, see BORN, supra note 23, at 199–202. 
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protection for sovereign states, to an extent beyond that of other 
countries.25  
After its adoption, the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity 
espoused in the Tate Letter proved difficult for the State Department to 
apply because it required the executive branch to perform a judicial-like 
function through the State Department.26 To determine whether a 
government was immune from suit, the State Department had to make a 
factual determination on the basis of the complaint.27 This difficulty in 
application has led both the judicial and legislative branches to clarify and 
alter the sovereign immunity extended by the American government in the 
years following the writing of the Tate Letter.28  
As part of this further development of American sovereign immunity, 
Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act29 (“FSIA”) in 
1976 to alleviate some of the confusion surrounding the sovereign 
immunity doctrine and transfer responsibility for the factual determination 
of immunity to the judiciary.30 As of its adoption, the FSIA became the 
only source of jurisdiction over foreign nations.31 The FSIA established a 
presumption of immunity with several enumerated exceptions.32 These 
exceptions conformed generally to the Tate Letter’s restrictive immunity, 
providing immunity only for sovereign acts and not for private or 
 25. Id. at 211. 
 26. Id. See also Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Note: a Critique of the Terrorism Exception to the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 887, 894 (2002) (noting that while 
the Tate Letter purported to distinguish between acts that did or did not subject a foreign government 
to liability, in reality there were few concrete guiding principles for use in making such 
determinations, and the result was that “the diplomatic pressure that other countries exerted came to 
influence the determination of grants of immunity more than the Tate Letter’s criteria.”). 
 27. BORN, supra note 23, at 211. Because the State Department was required to make factual 
determinations while being subject to political pressures, the results were arbitrary and unpredictable. 
Id., citing Rich v. Naviera Vacuba SA, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).  
 28. Id.  
 29. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1330, §§ 1602–1611). 
 30. Id. See also Ved. P. Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign Individual Immunities (Sovereign 
Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity)—Some Reflections, 5 ILSA 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467 (1999). 
 31. Ismael Diaz, A Critique of Proposals to Amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to 
Allow Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns for Human Rights Violations, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 137, 142 (2001). Since its enactment, the FSIA has been the source of approximately 10–15 
cases per year, 5 of which have progressed to the Supreme Court. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Civil 
Remedies for International Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 169, 242 (2000). However, the majority 
of these cases have been litigated under the commercial acts exception to the FSIA. Id. 
 32. For the exceptions provided in the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605 or see generally infra note 29. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p533 note Plaster book pages.doc 12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
538 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:533 
 
 
 
 
 
 
commercial acts.33 For cases falling under the FSIA exceptions, the statute 
grants both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction.34
In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co.,35 the Supreme 
Court held that the FSIA constitutes the sole basis for suing a foreign 
government.36 As such, there can be no cause of action against a foreign 
government without application of one of the enumerated exceptions 
contained within the FSIA.37 The Amerada holding was a blow to those 
seeking civil recourse from foreign governments for human rights 
violations because there was no enumerated exception under the FSIA that 
would directly apply to human rights violations.38 Therefore, after 
Amerada, those seeking to bring civil suits against foreign states arising 
out of human rights-related torts attempted to mold their cases in such a 
way as to fit them under the non-commercial torts exception to the FSIA, 
with some limited success.39 However the Supreme Court soon responded 
by narrowing the use of the non-commercial torts exception in Saudi 
Arabia v. Nelson,40 holding that a commercial activity must still be the 
“gravamen of the complaint.”41 The Court in Nelson also required that the 
 33. Prior to the 1996 amendments (see the AEDPA, discussed infra notes 44–50), there were 
eight general categories of cases excepted from sovereign immunity under the FSIA: (1) those in 
which sovereign immunity is waived, (2) those which concern a commercial activity with an 
appropriate nexus to the United States, (3) those in which property within the United States has been 
taken in violation of international law, (4) those involving the rights to property within the United 
States obtained by succession or as a gift, (5) those in which the cause of action arises out of a 
noncommercial tort occurring within the borders of the United States, (6) those relating to arbitration, 
(7) those dealing with certain specified admiralty matters, and (8) counterclaims. 28 U.S.C. § 1605; 
BORN, supra note 23, at 226. 
 34. BORN, supra note 23, at 211. Note, however, that the jurisdiction granted by the FSIA is 
limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) only to non-jury civil actions. Id. at 212. This limitation was apparently 
intended to prevent arbitrary or unpredictable decisions by American juries where the liability of a 
foreign sovereign is at stake. Id. 
 35. 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
 36. Id at 434. 
 37. Id. at 443. The plaintiff in Amerada Hess brought suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), against the Argentine Republic for destruction of its ship in the course of the 
Falkland Islands War. Id. at 432. The Supreme Court held that the suit could not be brought against the 
government of Argentina in American courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act, instead requiring an 
explicit exception to the FSIA in order to hurdle the immunity requirement. Id. at 443. The Alien Tort 
Claims Act provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United States,” and 
provides federal jurisdiction over tort cases brought by an alien, arising out of a violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 38. Nanda, supra note 30, at 471 (noting that the enumerated exceptions in the FSIA yield little 
opportunity for human rights-related suits, and that courts have rejected the argument that a gross 
violation of human rights should not be excused from liability, regardless of sovereign immunity). 
 39. BORN, supra note 23, at 226. 
 40. 507 U.S. 349 (1993).  
 41. Id. at 357, citing Callejo v. Bancorner, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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activity leading to the complaint must have actually taken place within the 
United States or cause a “direct effect” in the United States.42 Thus, after 
Nelson, the victims of international terrorism were precluded from 
bringing suit against the governments of states that sponsored terrorism, 
and were often left with no legal recourse and little opportunity for 
compensation.43  
Victims of terrorism saw some renewed potential for civil suits in 
1996, when Congress enacted the AEDPA44 in the interest of 
compensating those victims and deterring future acts of terrorism 
 42. Id. 
 43. For an indication of the sentiment of terrorism victims prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, 
infra notes 44–50, see Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts: Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice, 
Hearing on the Foreign Sovereign Immunity (sic) Act, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement by 
David P. Jacobsen offered at the Hearing on the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1993 to Amend 
Title 28 of the United States Code) (available at 1994 WL 274223 (F.D.C.H.)). In 1985, Jacobsen was 
kidnapped in Beirut by the Iranian-sponsored terrorist group Islamic Jihad while he was working as the 
Chief Executive Officer of the American University of Beirut’s Medical Center. Jacobsen says that it 
is “irrefutable” that Islamic Jihad was paid millions of dollars by the Iranian government to carry out 
the kidnapping. Id. Upon being released, Jacobsen’s written statement says that his joy was 
“diminished by the vicious partisan politics of Iran/Contra and the creation of a nightmare.” Id. On his 
return to the United States, Jacobsen says he was “literally dropped on the streets of Washington DC 
without money, credit cards or identification,” was unable to find a job, lost the opportunity to marry 
the love of his life, and that “[his] freedom was filled with pain, frustration, discouragement and 
anger.” Id. In a startling example of the frustration of victims which led to enactment of the AEDPA, 
Jacobsen exclaimed before the subcommittee, “Iran destroyed my life! I want justice! As an American 
citizen, I should be entitled to my day in court.” Id. 
 44. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) 
(codified as amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000)). 
AEDPA states: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of 
the States in any case—. . . 
 (7) . . . in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or 
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 
18) for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, 
employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment, or agency, except that the court shall decline to hear a claim under this 
paragraph— 
 (a) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) at the time the act occurred, unless later 
so designated as a result of such act or the act is related to Case Number 1:00CV03110(EGS) 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; and 
 (b) even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if—the act occurred in the foreign 
state against which the claim has been brought and the claimant has not afforded the foreign 
state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international 
rules of arbitration; or neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the United States 
(as that term is defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) when 
the act upon which the claim is based occurred. 
Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p533 note Plaster book pages.doc 12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
540 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:533 
 
 
 
 
 
 
committed on foreign soil against American citizens.45 The AEDPA was 
meant to be “an Act to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide 
for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes.”46 It provided, 
among other things, for an amendment to the FSIA providing jurisdiction 
in American courts for actions against foreign states arising out of acts of 
terrorism.47 More specifically, the AEDPA abrogated the sovereign 
immunity of those states designated by the State Department as sponsors 
of terrorism48 with regard to actions arising out of acts of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of 
material support or resources for such an act if the act or provision of 
material support was engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment, or agency.49 The AEDPA also required that if the terrorist act 
occurred within a foreign country, the plaintiff must “afford the terrorist 
state ‘a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with 
accepted international rules of arbitration.’”50 Plaintiff-victims were also 
 45. See Reisman & Hakimi, supra note 8, at 565–66, for a description of the events leading up to 
the enactment of the AEDPA. Reisman and Hakimi explain that the convergence of families from the 
two terrorist acts of the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 and the bombing of PanAm Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 led to a political rallying of the forces between the two groups. Id. The 
families of the Oklahoma City victims sought to prevent those responsible for the bombing from using 
the court system to defer the death penalty for years, and the families of the Lockerbie bombings 
sought access to the American courts in suits against the foreign government(s) who sponsored the 
bombing of Flight 103. Id. 
 46. AEDPA preamble. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(7) (2000)).   
 47. Id. 
 48. Patterns of Global Terrorism—2001, released by the Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/ 
10249.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). The seven states that are currently designated by the State 
Department as sponsors of terrorism are: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Cuba, North Korea, and Syria. Id. 
While the government of Afghanistan may have arguably been the greatest supporter of the terrorists 
who carried out the attacks of September 11, 2001, it should be noted that because the American 
government never recognized the Taliban as a legitimate government, Afghanistan was never added to 
the list. Id. The other suspected state sponsor of the September 11 attacks, Saudi Arabia, has never 
been designated a sponsor of terrorism, perhaps due to the importance of its sometimes tenuous 
diplomatic relations with the United States. Id. 
 49. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000)).  
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). See also Nanda, supra note 30, at 472 (explaining the provisions of 
the AEDPA); Taylor, supra note 7, at 536 (summarizing the requirements of the AEDPA’s terrorism 
exception to the FSIA as:  
First, the case must be one in which “money damages are sought against a foreign state for 
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support . . . for such an act.” Second, the 
claimant or victim must be a U.S. national when the act of terrorism occurs. Third, the foreign 
state must be designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the State Department at the time the 
act occurs. Finally, if the act of terrorism occurred in the defendant state’s territory, a plaintiff 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/7
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provided with a civil cause of action for damages arising out of terrorist 
acts via a contemporary amendment known as the Flatow Amendment.51 
This amendment specifically allows damages for pain and suffering, 
economic damages, solatium, and even punitive damages.52 However, it 
should be noted that while the AEDPA provided an exception to the 
sovereign immunity of terrorist states themselves (in addition to their 
agents and officials), the language of the Flatow Amendment provided a 
cause of action only against agents and officials of the state.53 While 
interesting, this has not been a stumbling block for plaintiffs because, until 
recently,54 courts have permitted civil suits against the states themselves 
under the Flatow Amendment, regardless of the lack of an explicit creation 
of such a cause of action.55
In the first three cases brought under the AEDPA, significant amounts 
of compensatory and punitive damages were awarded to plaintiffs and 
their families.56 However, enforcing the judgments proved problematic for 
must first attempt arbitration in accordance with international rules.). 
 51. Flatow Amendment, also titled the Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (West Supp. 1997). The Act provides:  
An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism 
. . . while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to 
a United States national . . . for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, 
employee, or agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under 
(the AEDPA).  
Id. 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. 
 53. Id. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 96 A.J.I.L. 956, 964 (2002) (noting that the Flatow Amendment is, “by its terms, 
more narrow than the terrorist-state exception to sovereign immunity; the Flatow amendment confers a 
right of action only against an ‘official, employee, or agent of a foreign state.’”). 
 54. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004). For further 
discussion of Cicippio-Puleo, see infra note 99. 
 55. See, e.g., cases discussed infra note 56. 
 56. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (awarding damages to 
the three former hostage plaintiffs of $2.9 million, $2.7 million, and $850,000 respectively); Flatow v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (awarding $1,513,220 in lost wages and 
funeral expenses for the death of a college student killed in a suicide bombing); Alejandre v. Republic 
of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (awarding economic damages of approximately $12 
million to the estates of three Americans killed on a humanitarian mission when their plane was shot 
down by the Cuban Air Force). The Flatow court also addressed the appropriate measure of punitive 
damages under the statute and held that three times the state’s annual expenditure on terrorism was 
appropriate, reasoning that:  
[b]y creating these rights of action, Congress intended that the Courts impose a substantial 
financial cost on states which sponsor terrorist groups whose activities kill American citizens. 
This cost functions both as a direct deterrent, and also as a disabling mechanism: if several 
large punitive damage awards issue against a foreign state sponsor of terrorism, the state’s 
financial capacity to provide funding will be curtailed. 
999 F. Supp. at 33–34. 
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these plaintiffs.57 Because the President’s foreign relations power requires 
that he retain the power to block attachment of the assets of foreign states 
located within the United States, the plaintiffs who recovered damages 
under the AEDPA have found that their legal victories are empty ones.58 
For example, in one of the earliest and most influential cases brought 
under the AEDPA terrorism exception to the FSIA, the plaintiffs 
recovered a total judgment of nearly $248 million against the state of Iran. 
However, the attachment of such judgment was precluded by the United 
States because of the President’s waiver power.59  
Under pressure from victims and their families who were disillusioned 
with the AEDPA and the Flatow Amendment, Congress enacted section 
117 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1999 (“§ 117”),60 which permitted plaintiffs who 
had recovered under the AEDPA to attach diplomatic and consular 
properties located within the United States.61 However, the legislation may 
 57. For the source of the President’s authority to block assets, see The Trading with the Enemy 
Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1994); § 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2370(a) (1994); §§ 202 and 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1701–02 (1994). After the President used his waiver power to block attachment, the plaintiffs in 
these specific cases (Cicippio, Flatow, and Alejandre) were later specially designated as recipients of 
United States Treasury funds in satisfaction of their judgments under the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000. See infra note 70. The President has also exercised his authority to 
freeze or block the assets of foreign states in the interest of foreign relations in other contexts, for 
example President Carter blocked Iranian assets in 1979. Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. § 457 
(1980). See also 182 A.L.R. Fed. 1, § 2b, noting that “[a]s a practical matter, enforcing judgments 
obtained under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has 
proved (sic) frustrating and futile” (internal citations omitted).  
 58. 182 A.L.R. Fed. 1, § 2b. For a discussion of the presidential efforts to block recovery under 
the statute see Sean K. Mangan, Compensation for “Certain” Victims of Terrorism Under Section 
2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Individual Payments at an 
Institutional Cost, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1037, 1038 (2002). 
 59. Id. at 1044, discussing Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 1. The United States government, acting on 
behalf of the Iranian government, reminded the court that the assets in question had been blocked in 
response to Iran’s aggression against overseas U.S. interests and therefore were property of the United 
States. Id. at 1045. Thus the assets were technically protected by the United States’ own sovereign 
immunity. Id. The plaintiff, Mr. Flatow, continued unsuccessfully to seek enforcement of the judgment 
against Iran, as described in his own words in an editorial published in the Washington Post in 1999. 
Stephen M. Flatow, Editorial, In This Case, I Can’t be Diplomatic; I Lost a Child to Terrorism; Now 
I’m Losing U.S. Support, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1999, at B2 [hereinafter Flatow Editorial]. Mr. Flatow 
was eventually able to recover in 2000 under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. 
See infra note 70. 
 60. § 117 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–91 (1998). 
 61. Id. In his editorial to the Washington Post, Stephen Flatow mentions the enactment of § 117 
and the initial belief of victims that it would provide for at least partial satisfaction of their court 
judgments by allowing for attachment of “a wider range of (Iranian government) assets.” Flatow 
Editorial, supra note 59. 
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have been a compromise, because Congress retained a presidential waiver 
provision in § 117, permitting the President to prohibit the attachment of 
such assets where it is determined to be in the interest of national 
security.62 On the same date that President Clinton signed § 117 into law, 
he exercised this built-in waiver to provide a blanket prohibition on the 
attachment of the same diplomatic and consular properties which the 
AEDPA and § 117 were meant to make available.63
In response to President Clinton’s exercise of the § 117 presidential 
waiver, the House and Senate both introduced bills to limit the President’s 
ability to block attachment of assets, thus making those assets available for 
use by the courts in the satisfaction of judgments.64 Together these 
provisions made up the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.65 This Act 
sought to ensure victim compensation and to strengthen the deterrent 
power of American courts over foreign states that sponsor terrorism by 
making enforcement of judgments more possible and more likely.66 Faced 
with significant opposition from the executive branch,67 both provisions 
eventually failed and were not enacted.68  
 62. Id. 
 63. Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59201 (Oct. 21, 1998). 
 64. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, S. 1796, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced October 26, 
1999) [hereinafter S. 1796]; H.R. 3485, 106th Cong. (2000) (passed in the House on July 25, 2000) 
[hereinafter H.R. 3485]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Mangan, supra note 58, at 1047. The Senate version provided for: (1) execution of 
judgments by attaching any judgments owed to the foreign state by the United States government via a 
waiver of American sovereign immunity; (2) a limited presidential waiver which could be exercised 
only on an asset-by-asset basis, in the interest of national security, where the assets to be attached were 
intended for the operation or value of a foreign diplomatic mission; and (3) elimination of the “Bancec 
Rule,” which had limited the amount of assets attachable under the AEDPA to those connected to the 
terrorist act itself. Id. at 1048. The House version was substantially the same, except for the addition of 
provisions increasing the amount of damages plaintiffs could recover and easing the burden of proof 
for plaintiffs. Id. at 1049. Testimony in support of the bills included the comments of both Terry 
Anderson, who was kidnapped and held hostage in Lebanon by the terrorist group Hezbollah for seven 
years, and Steven Flatow, the father of suicide bombing victim Alisa Flatow. Id. at 1050, citing 
Terrorism Victim Compensation Bill: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000).  
 67. Letter from Stuart Eizenstat to the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. Rep. 106-733 (2000) 
(joint testimony of Stuart Eizenstat, Walter Slocombe, and Thomas Pickering). The executive branch, 
under President Clinton, submitted a letter written from Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Stuart 
Eizenstat to the House Judiciary Committee in opposition to the legislation, describing five general 
objections to the provisions it contained: (1) permitting attachment of assets by plaintiffs would 
eliminate the State Department’s ability to block access to those assets by foreign governments; (2) 
permitting attachment of diplomatic properties would potentially violate international treaty 
agreements and possibly expose American diplomatic properties to the same kind of attachment; (3) 
because the legislation proposed to compensate only plaintiffs who had already recovered, current and 
future plaintiffs would be treated inequitably; (4) garnishment of debts owed to the U.S. would 
potentially threaten the stability of defense-related transactions between American suppliers and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p533 note Plaster book pages.doc 12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
544 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:533 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again under pressure from victims to limit the executive branch’s 
power and to increase enforceability of court-awarded damages, Congress 
later introduced more successful bills in another apparent compromise.69 
These bills were signed into law as the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“Victim Protection Act”).70 This Act 
provided recovery only for those plaintiffs who had already obtained a 
final judgment against a state under the AEDPA,71 and did so not by 
attachment of assets, but by drawing directly on United States Treasury 
funds.72 Upon signing the Victim Protection Act, the President emphasized 
that while those plaintiffs who had already obtained judgments deserved 
satisfaction, the executive branch did not believe that court actions were 
the proper means of providing compensation to victims of terrorism.73 At 
foreign countries; and (5) the attachment of banking assets would create an international perception 
that banking and investing within the United States is unreliable and threaten attachment of American 
accounts in banks overseas. Id. 
 68. Mangan, supra note 58, at 1047. 
 69. See infra note 70. 
 70. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1541 (2000).  
 71. The plaintiffs who were able to recover under the Victim Protection Act included Mr. 
Flatow, whose energetic and assertive battle for damages has been noted throughout this Note. Mr. 
Flatow recovered $22 million under the Victim Protection Act, paid out of Treasury funds 
(specifically, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal) rather than from Iranian assets within the United States. 
Pamela S. Falk, Suing Saddam: Victims of Terror Cannot Thaw Iraq’s Frozen Assets, N.Y.L.J. vol. 
228, at 4 (Oct. 11, 2002). 
 72. Section 2002(a)(1)(A) of the Act provides for plaintiffs to collect “110 percent of 
compensatory damages” if they give up the opportunity to later collect punitive damages arising out of 
the same action. Alternatively, section 2002(a)(1)(B) provides for plaintiffs to recover “100 percent of 
compensatory damages,” while retaining the option of seeking punitive damages. Victim Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002(a)(1)(A)–(B), 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Because the payments under 
the Act came directly from Treasury funds, many commentators have noted the lack of deterrent 
effect. For example as Roger Parloff has noted, “[I]t is hard to believe that Iran will be cowed into 
moderation by the prospect of having large judgments paid on its behalf by the U.S. Treasury.” Roger 
Parloff, Deep Freezing Terror’s Assets, AM. LAW., June 2002, at 122. 
 73. See White House Press Release, Oct. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 1617316, stating:  
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, signed by [President 
Clinton], will provide much deserved compensation to American victims of terrorism and 
their families. This legislation is a measure of the United States Government’s commitment to 
the victims of terrorism, to deter future acts of terrorism, and to defend the United States from 
its evils. 
 The struggle to defeat terrorism is not helped, however, by putting into effect provisions 
that would permit individuals who win court judgments against nations on the State 
Department’s terrorist list to attach diplomatic and certain other properties. Attachment of 
diplomatic properties runs counter to other provisions of U.S. law and in some instances our 
treaty obligations and could result in retaliation, placing our embassies and citizens overseas 
at grave risk. It also would undermine our ability to use blocked properties as leverage in 
foreign policy disputes . . . 
 Under the law, the President can waive the attachment provision to protect the national 
security interest of the United States. President Clinton has signed the Victims of Trafficking 
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the same time, the President exercised what limited waiver power he was 
still allowed under the new legislation, affirming the executive branch’s 
commitment to retaining control over foreign assets.74 The White House 
was concerned that the use of civil actions against nation-states otherwise 
entitled to sovereign immunity would undermine the effectiveness of other 
laws and limit the ability of the United States to comply with treaty 
obligations.75 In addition, the White House asserted that permitting 
plaintiffs to attach diplomatic assets would preclude the American 
government from using those assets as leverage in negotiations and 
diplomacy.76
The issue of tort compensation for plaintiff-victims came into focus 
again in 2002 after the increased awareness of the American people to the 
risks of terrorism.77 In response to a resurgence in public pressure, 
Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance (Protection) Act of 2002 
(“Terrorism Risk Insurance Act”).78 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
provides assistance to the insurance industry in order to make terrorism 
insurance more widely available, and includes provisions consolidating 
lawsuits arising out of acts of terrorism into a single suit for each act of 
terrorism.79 Similar to the Senate and House provisions proposed as part of 
the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, which had failed in 1999,80 the 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000 and, in the interests of protecting America’s security, 
has exercised the waiver authority that was first used in 1998. 
Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. For example, President Carter exercised his power to use assets as leverage in securing 
the release of American hostages held in Iran when the United States entered into the Algiers Accords 
on January 19, 1980, settling various claims between the two nations, and additionally agreeing to “bar 
and preclude the prosecution against Iran of any . . . claim of . . . a United States national arising out of 
the [the hostage-taking].” Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(citing Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, General Principles, ¶ 11. Iran-
United States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20 I.L.M. 223, 227 (1981)). The Roeder Court noted 
that the power to abrogate the terms of the Algiers Accord belongs only to the political branches, and 
that “[t]he political considerations that must be balanced prior to such a decision are beyond both the 
expertise and the mandate of this Court.” Id. Were there suits outstanding against Iran at the time of 
the Algiers Accords, it would have been vital for President Carter to be able to block the use of those 
assets for satisfaction of judgments and instead use them to secure the hostages’ release. Id. 
 77. For an account of public pressure on Congress regarding terrorism legislation in 2002, see 
Marcia Coyle, Helping the Victims, 26 NAT’L L.J., No. 14, Nov. 25, 2005, at A1. 
 78. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), (codified 
in 15 U.S.C. § 1610 note, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1610 (2003)). 
 79. Id. § 107. Section 107, titled litigation management, provides for a federal cause of action 
against those who commit acts of terrorism (the Act does not explicitly provide a cause of action 
against the governments of states who sponsor terrorism), and requires that suits brought under the act 
be consolidated in federal district court by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. 
 80. For a discussion of the ill-fated Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, see supra notes 64–67 
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Act limited the President’s waiver power to 
those cases in which an asset-by-asset determination is made that the 
waiver is “necessary in the general national security interest.”81 Even then, 
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act prohibits the President from using the 
waiver to protect any properties not specifically subject to the Vienna 
Convention.82 Thus the current state of the law has reduced the President’s 
influence over damages levied against foreign states for sponsorship of 
terrorism to an asset-by-asset limitation on specific diplomatic properties 
in which prohibiting attachment is first determined to be necessary for 
national security.83 The White House has expressed frustration with the 
“piecemeal legislative approach that addresses some victims and not 
others,” and has suggested that Congress should develop a plan which 
preserves the “prerogatives of the President in the area of foreign affairs” 
by providing compensation to all victims, drawn from alternative funds 
other than blocked assets.84  
At the explicit request of the State Department,85 the Senate recently 
considered legislation titled “The Benefits for Victims of International 
Terrorism Act of 2003” that would provide no-fault compensation for 
victims of terrorism, similar to that advocated by the executive branch.86 
and accompanying text. 
 81. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 78, § 201(b). 
 82. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 78. See also Taylor, supra note 7 at 543. 
 83. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 78, § 201(b). 
 84. Statement by the President, White House Office of Communications, Office of the Press 
Secretary, Sept. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 31161653, stating that  
[w]hile U.S. victims of international terrorism are deserving of compensation in accordance 
with the law, the continued piecemeal legislative approach that addresses some victims and 
not others is neither equitable nor practicable. The Congress should develop a compre-
hensive (sic) proposal that provides compensation for all victims . . . Such a proposal should 
not draw upon blocked assets to fund victim compensation, so as to preserve the prerogative 
of the President in the area of foreign affairs. 
Id. 
 85. In a letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of 
Legislative Affairs, U.S. State Department, stated that the legislation was based on three guiding 
principles: (1) equal benefits for victims from all socioeconomic levels, (2) receipt of compensation as 
quickly as possible, and (3) placing compensation benefits on par with those offered to public safety 
officers’ families if killed in the line of duty. Letter from Paul V. Kelly to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (June 5, 2003) (published at 149 Cong. Rec. S7981-01). The letter also emphasized the 
State Department’s preference for a no-fault scheme drawing on Treasury funds rather than reliance on 
civil suits for compensation, and reiterated the executive branch’s concern for presidential foreign 
relations power, stating, “[i]n contrast to a mechanism that uses blocked assets and rewards those that 
can secure judgements [sic] before such assets are exhausted, a fund based on the above principles 
would provide compensation for all victims fairly and equitably. It also preserves the President’s 
prerogatives in the area of foreign affairs.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. The Benefits for Victims of International Terrorism Act of 2003, S. 1275, 108th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2003). The bill was introduced in the Senate at the request of the State Department on June 17, 
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This legislation, if passed, would be a constructive step toward a better 
compensation scheme. However, it would still be insufficient in that it 
includes few limitations on the ability of victims to bring civil suits against 
foreign governments and therefore would not eliminate the problems 
created by allowing private suits against foreign governments, as 
articulated in this Note.87
III. A NO-FAULT COMPENSATION MODEL—THE SEPTEMBER 11TH 
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 
On September 22, 2001, Congress enacted a hastily-drawn statute 
providing compensation and reparations to the victims and industries 
affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.88 After several 
minor revisions according to the needs and desires of the victims’ families, 
this statute provides compensation for victims without any required 
showing of fault.89 To receive no-fault compensation under the statute, 
victims are required only to prove injury and to waive any right to a cause 
of action against all defendants, with the exception of the terrorists 
themselves and their organizations.90 Although there has been no litigation 
as to whether actions against state sponsors are waived under the statute, 
the waiver appears to have been intended as protection for American 
industries and facilities such as the Port Authority and the airlines,91 and 
therefore is not likely to prevent suits under the AEDPA. Compensation 
under the statute includes both economic and non-economic damages, but 
does differ from fault-based tort law in that it retains the common law 
collateral-source rule requiring that any compensation from other 
insurance or pension sources be deducted from the damages awarded.92 
2003 and was passed to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who held hearings on it on July 
17, 2003. As of October 2004, no further progress has been made. 
 87. Id. The only reference made in the bill to civil suits under the AEDPA is a requirement in 
section 112(c)(2) precluding victims from both maintaining a civil suit and receiving compensation 
under the proposed legislation. Id. § 112(c)(2).  
 88. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, also titled the September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, Title IV, 115 Stat. 237 (2001) [hereinafter 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund].
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Kenneth P. Nolan & Jeanne M. O’Grady, A Year Later—The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund, available at http://www.speiserkrause.com/publications/compensation_fund.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Nolan & O’Grady]. 
 92. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 88. The retention of the collateral-
source rule is rumored to have been a concession in exchange for removing a cap on attorney’s fees for 
plaintiff’s lawyers representing victims. See Nolan & O’Grady, supra note 91. 
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Non-economic damages are set at an even amount for all plaintiffs.93 This 
set amount was intended to solve the potential irregularity in allowing 
thousands of jurors to sit on thousands of victims’ cases and award widely 
differing amounts of damages for pain and suffering.94
IV. ANALYSIS 
This Note examines the efficacy and advisability of providing a civil 
cause of action against the governments of foreign states that sponsor 
terrorist acts against American citizens, and of then excepting suits 
brought under that cause of action from the sovereign immunity to which 
other governments are entitled. The problems with this policy are 
numerous,95 but the most egregious fall into three broad categories. First, 
the availability of a civil cause of action misleads American plaintiffs into 
expecting ready enforcement of damages, but instead they find frustration 
and an inability to recover the damages they have been awarded.96 Second, 
because the United States Treasury has repeatedly been forced to absorb 
the un-enforced judgments, few foreign states have felt the sting of the 
court judgments and thus have not been punished or deterred.97 Finally, 
placing the foreign relations power with the judicial branch has resulted in 
improper separation of powers and has crippled the President’s ability to 
exercise his foreign relations power.98
 93. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 88. 
 94. Final Rule, Statement by the Special Master, Department of Justice Office of the Attorney 
General, Mar. 13, 2002, 67 C.F.R. § 49 (2002). Stating,  
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is a unique federal program created by 
Congress in recognition of the special tragic circumstances these victims and their families 
confront. The Fund provides an alternative to the significant risk, expense, and delay inherent 
in civil litigation by offering victims and their families an opportunity to receive swift, 
inexpensive, and predictable resolution of claims. The Fund provides an unprecedented level 
of federal financial assistance for surviving victims and the families of deceased victims.  
Id. (emphasis added). The Final Rule, published on March 13, 2002, also clarified the amount of non-
economic damages set for each victim’s family at a presumed value of $100,000 for each spouse and 
dependent, in addition to $250,000 presumed for every victim: “[t]his means that a family of a victim 
who was survived by a spouse and two minor children would be entitled to a presumed non-economic 
award of over half a million dollars before collateral-source offsets.” Id. 
 95. Taylor, supra note 7, at 537 (asserting that “the terrorism exception (to the AEDPA) has 
resulted in a litigation quagmire that frustrates plaintiffs, leaves many terrorist victims without an 
effective remedy, costs taxpayers millions, and significantly, leaves terrorists undeterred.”). 
 96. See infra text accompanying notes 98–105. 
 97. See infra text accompanying notes 106–10. 
 98. See infra text accompanying notes 111–15. 
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A. False Hopes of Compensation 
The terrorism exception to the FSIA contained in the AEDPA and the 
Flatow Amendment establishing a civil cause of action99 against state 
sponsors of terrorism combine to swindle plaintiffs by presenting a route 
to recovery that is deceptively similar to that in everyday American tort 
law.100 Plaintiffs are led to expect that a suit against an uncooperative 
foreign nation whose relations with the United States may be tenuous at 
best will be administered and enforced just like a common civil suit in an 
American court.101 Instead, many of the plaintiffs who have successfully 
brought suits under the AEDPA are still waiting for execution of their 
judgments.102 In the midst of the battle between the judicial branch and the 
 99. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit called into question whether the AEDPA 
in conjunction with the Flatow Amendment did in fact create a private federal cause of action against 
foreign governments. Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d 1024. The case was brought against the government of 
Iran by the children and siblings of Joseph Cicippio, who was held hostage by Hezbollah from 1986 
until 1991, seeking damages based on emotional distress and loss of solatium. Id. at 1026. The 
Cicippio-Puleo court considered congressional intent in enacting the Flatow Amendment, and held that 
the cause of action established in that amendment applied only to officials, employees, and agents of a 
foreign state in their individual capacities and remanded the case in order to permit the plaintiffs to 
amend their complaint. Id. at 1033. The court warned that a waiver of immunity, while undoubtedly 
included in the AEDPA, does not establish a cause of action on its own, and further that the Flatow 
Amendment does not explicitly mention the liability of foreign states themselves. Id. In an amicus 
brief filed by the Department of Justice for the State Department, the government asserted that 
“[creating a cause of action against a foreign government itself] could have serious adverse 
consequences for the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Branch, and . . . should be 
recognized only if Congress has acted clearly in that direction.” Id. at 1031, citing Br. for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 5. In this author’s opinion, this ruling may have significant consequences 
on the future of civil causes of action against the governments of states sponsoring terrorism, and if 
appealed could give the executive branch the opportunity to argue its side of the issue to the Supreme 
Court. 
 100. In a 1999 editorial to the Washington Post, Stephen Flatow described his reaction to the 
passing of the AEDPA: “This law would be my tool, I thought. I would use the institutions of a just 
society to seek justice.” Flatow Editorial, supra note 59 (emphasis added). Mr. Flatow clearly believed, 
and continues to believe, that he should be able to impose the American system of tort law on the 
government of Iran and achieve quick results and compensation similar to that afforded plaintiffs 
bringing civil suits in the United States. In the same editorial, Mr. Flatow described his continued 
search for enforcement of the judgments he recovered as “efforts to make the Iranians pay the price 
prescribed by U.S. Law.” Id. 
 101. See Reisman & Hakimi, supra note 8, at 561 (pointing out that with the enactment of the 
AEDPA and the Flatow amendment, “U.S. plaintiffs now could receive awards of damages—and, 
potentially, very high awards . . . [T]he only problem was that Congress did not provide a means by 
which to satisfy those awards.”). Id. at 568. 
 102. For example, for information about the results of lawsuits brought by the surviving hostages 
from the Iranian Hostage Crisis see http://www.bartleby.com/65/ir/Iranhost.html (last visited Mar. 2, 
2004):  
In 2000 former hostages and their survivors sued Iran under the 1996 Antiterrorism Act, 
which permits U.S. citizens to sue foreign governments in cases of state-sponsored terrorism. 
The following year they won the lawsuit by default when Iran did not offer a defense. The 
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executive and legislative branches, the plaintiff-victims seeking recovery 
under the AEDPA have become dehumanized pawns, unable to actually 
recover any compensation and left only with a “moral victory.”103 Because 
the executive branch justifiably opposes execution of the judgments, 
placing the interests of the country as a whole over the satisfaction of 
judgments which would benefit only a few citizens, the judgments are 
reduced to mere words, perhaps emotionally cathartic but devoid of any 
financial compensation.104 The vast majority of judgments have remained 
un-enforced and appear to be unenforceable.105 The victims are left 
without monetary compensation or any physical manifestation of their 
victories, and with substantial legal fees incurred from prosecuting the 
actions.106  
B. Ineffective Deterrence 
The failure of the cases brought under the AEDPA to achieve any form 
of compensation for the plaintiffs is closely tied to the failure of the same 
cases to deter defendants.107 Deterrence was one of the main purposes of 
the Act, which was “enacted explicitly with the intent to alter the conduct 
of foreign states, particularly towards U.S. nationals traveling abroad.”108 
Without execution of judgments, the defendant states have felt no 
U.S. State Dept. sought dismissal of the suit, arguing it would hinder its ability to negotiate 
international agreements, and a federal judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit for damages in 
2002, ruling that the agreement that resulted in their release barred awarding any damages.  
Id. 
 103. Reisman & Hakimi, supra note 8, at 570 (describing the award of damages in Alejandre v. 
Republic of Cuba and stating that “because the 1996 legislation did not provide a means to satisfy 
judicial awards, the award in Alejandre . . . was a moral, rather than an economic, victory.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 573 (“The plaintiffs may have felt vindicated, but, if the defendant states had assets in 
the United States, the executive did not allow enforcement. The awards thus remained unenforced, 
and, it seemed, unenforceable.”). 
 106. Id. (concluding that the AEDPA verdicts “had an eerie, autistic national character; their 
effects remained largely within the United States and were never tested against international law—
because, from the standpoint of international law, in the absence of execution or judgment, nothing 
was happening.”). 
 107. Because the defendant states rarely appeared in court to defend these cases and have not been 
forced to satisfy judgments against them, the civil cause of action against a terrorist state acts as a 
paper tiger with no real consequences and no deterrent effect. As noted by one commentator, “it is 
hard to believe that Iran will be cowed into moderation by the prospect of having large judgments paid 
on its behalf by the U.S. Treasury—which is what is happening at the moment.” Roger Parloff, 
Cathartic Suits Against Terrorists are Impractical, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June 26, 2002. 
 108. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 12, discussed in Taylor, supra note 7, at 537 (stating that the effect of 
the AEDPA’s terrorism exception was to “erode traditional diplomatic protections without providing a 
workable system of compensation and deterrence.”). 
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punishment or loss owing to their actions, even with exorbitant punitive 
damage awards.109 In exercising the necessary amount of discretion over 
enforcement of judgments, the President has consistently resisted attaching 
the assets of defendant nations that are located within the United States 
and releasing them to plaintiffs.110 Where these damages have been paid, it 
has been at the expense of the American government, as in the case of 
those plaintiffs whose judgments were paid by funds from the United 
States Treasury as a result of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000.111 The statute does not serve its original function 
where the American government bears the brunt of the courts’ punitive 
damage awards, intended to punish and deter foreign states from future 
acts of terrorism. 
C. Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The Framers of the Constitution intended for the foreign relations 
powers to be limited to the political branches of government: the 
legislature and the executive.112 Courts have held that the AEDPA’s inter-
mingling of decision-making across the three branches of government 
does not explicitly render the law unconstitutional.113 However, this inter-
mingling limits the ability of all three branches to perform their normal 
functions.114 The judiciary is unable to reach all possible defendants—
there have been and will likely continue to be nations that sponsor 
terrorism but are, for one reason or another, not designated by the State 
 109. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 12. The Flatow opinion, written by Judge Lamberth of the D.C. 
District Court, strongly supported the deterrence goals of the AEDPA, holding that punitive damages 
in the amount of three times the state’s annual expenditure on the financing of terrorism would be 
sufficient to deter any future acts of terrorism. Id. The court awarded $225 million in punitive damages 
to Alisa Flatow’s surviving family, advocating very severe measures of damages and stating that the 
act of terrorism “extended to the very limits of any human being’s capacity to inflict pain and suffering 
upon another.” Id. 
 110. See supra notes 58–59, 63, 67–68, 73–76. 
 111. See supra notes 63–66. 
 112. Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffrey Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors 
of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 675, 
706 (1999) (noting that the questions reserved for the political branches include the issue of “when 
foreign sovereigns should answer in the courts of the United States.”). 
 113. See, e.g., 182 A.L.R. Fed. 1, § 2(a) (2003) (citing Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d in part on other grounds, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), and saying that “[c]onstitutional claims based on . . . inter-mingling of legislative and executive 
decision-making (based on the statute’s limitation of only states that have been designated by the 
executive branch as state sponsors of terrorism ) . . . have likewise been rejected.”). 
 114. Keith Sealing, State Sponsors of Terrorism is a Question, not an Answer: the Terrorism 
Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now than it did before 9/11, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 119, 120 
(2003).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p533 note Plaster book pages.doc 12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
552 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:533 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department as state sponsors of terrorism.115 The State Department, in 
turn, cannot fully carry out its diplomatic negotiations when property and 
assets that were once bargaining chips are claimed instead by plaintiff-
victims.116  
The repeatedly considered legislation limiting the President’s ability to 
waive the attachment of assets has been criticized by some commentators 
because it fails to fully abrogate the presidential waiver.117 However, this 
legislation is instead deserving of criticism because it abrogates too much 
presidential authority, too greatly weakening the executive branch’s power 
over foreign relations.118 With such legislation in place, the executive 
branch’s hands are tied, making it impossible to fully exercise the foreign 
relations power when subject to the prerogatives and demands of the 
courts and plaintiff-victims.119
In addition, some commentators have argued that the United States, if 
it should choose to permit attachment and recovery of the assets of foreign 
nations, should expect similar laws to be enacted across the world with 
regard to American assets. As one commentator noted,  
[s]ince there are many states that would consider the United States a 
state sponsor of terrorism, the United States should expect to be 
haled into diverse foreign domestic courts by victims of ‘terrorists’ 
funded and supplied by the United States, and should, collaterally, 
expect to see its foreign assets attached to satisfy judgments.120  
As predicted, Iran recently passed a reciprocal law permitting its 
citizens to maintain suits within Iranian domestic courts against the United 
States for acts of terrorism and has awarded $115 million to its first 
plaintiff, Hossein Alikhani.121 Gary Sick, who has served on the National 
 115. Id. Sealing writes, “[p]erhaps the most obvious flaw in the exception is that the primary 
sponsor of the terrorists was not even denominated a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’ at the time of the 
attack.” Presumably referring to Afghanistan as the primary sponsor, the author noted that Afghanistan 
could be added to the list as a result of the attacks, but “this creates other problems.” Id. at 120 n.3. In 
addition, a suit is currently pending against the government of Saudi Arabia for damages resulting 
from the September 11th attacks, but Saudi Arabia has not been designated a state sponsor of terrorism 
by the State Department and therefore its amenability to suit within the American courts will be called 
into question. Coyle, supra note 11, at A1. 
 116. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Reisman & Hakimi, supra note 8, at 573–75. 
 118. See supra notes 112–23 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 112–22 and accompanying text. 
 120. Sealing, supra note 114, at 122. The author further noted that “[i]n fact, Iran has passed 
legislation allowing Iranian victims of United States ‘interference’ to sue the United States in Iranian 
Courts.” Id.  
 121. Michael Theodolou, Tehran Court Rules Against US; Case Decided Last Week Could Lead 
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Security Council under three presidents, noted that the Iranian suit was 
prompted by the American courts awarding high amounts of damages 
against Iranians, saying “[i]f [the United States can] play that game, others 
can play that game too.”122 Commentators also note that the exorbitant 
damages awarded in American courts are seen as particularly egregious 
internationally, where the standards of compensation are much lower and 
punitive damages are rarely awarded.123
D. Call for Alternative Compensation 
Because of the failure of the AEDPA terrorism exception to provide 
adequate compensation to plaintiff-victims of international terrorism, its 
inadequacy as a deterrent measure, and its improper effects on the 
separation of powers doctrine limiting the political branches’ 
constitutionally-granted foreign relations powers, civil suits against state 
sponsors of terrorism should no longer be available to victims of 
terrorism.124 Instead, further debate is needed to find alternative means of 
providing compensation to the victims of international terrorism. A bill 
titled “The Benefits for Victims of International Terrorism Act of 
2003,”125 recently considered by the Senate, constitutes a promising step 
towards developing more suitable compensation, but does not go so far as 
to abrogate civil suits.126 The ideal system would provide easily obtained 
compensation, avoiding the hassle and pain of protracted lawsuits for 
victims, while limiting the expense and strain on the legal system caused 
to More Suits, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 3, 2003, at 6. Alikhani’s suit arises out of his arrest 
in the Bahamas in 1992 and subsequent four-month-long detainment. Id. Alikhani, an Iranian citizen 
who resides in Cyprus, was in the Bahamas when he was accused of violating sanctions against Libya. 
Id. He first attempted to bring his suit in an American district court in Florida, seeking damages of 
$360 million, but the case was dismissed when the court held that he had agreed not to seek 
reparations as a condition of his release. Id. Alikhani’s American attorney predicts that the Iranian 
judgment could spark a trend of suits in Iranian courts against the U.S. government, such as suits 
against the United States for supporting Iraq in the Iran/Iraq war, during which chemical weapons 
were used against the Iranians. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Reisman & Hakimi, supra note 8, at 581 (noting that international and domestic American 
law differ greatly on the standards of damages and compensation, and that the United States 
government is likely aware of the danger of introducing high damages to the international legal scene, 
particularly if the American government will be potentially found liable to foreign individuals in 
foreign courts, such as Alikhani). 
 124. As one editorialist argued regarding Mr. Flatow, a plaintiff who has recovered damages and 
was at the time arguing for attachment of assets to satisfy that judgment: “Mr. Flatow may choose to 
be undiplomatic, but he has no right to exercise foreign policy on my account.” Bradley J. Hernlem, 
Letters to the Editor, Op-Ed, Scapegoats for Terrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1999, at A40. 
 125. S. 1275, 108th Cong. (2004); see also infra note 128. 
 126. Id. 
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by thousands of lawsuits. Without plaintiff-victims seeking attachment of 
assets, the executive and legislative branches would be able to use frozen 
assets to their greatest potential as diplomatic leverage in order to deter 
future acts of terrorism and could continue to use military force or 
sanctions as necessary. Lastly, the political branches could maintain 
foreign relations as a separate endeavor, free from the demands of the 
American tort system.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The competing interests of the judiciary, in compensating plaintiff-
victims, and the legislative and executive branches, in maintaining control 
over the foreign relations of the United States, have rendered the AEDPA 
terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity a useless dead-end 
avenue for plaintiffs seeking damages for acts of international terrorism 
from the nations that sponsor them. The conflict between tort law and 
foreign relations has: (1) created a false hope for plaintiffs seeking 
compensation through civil action, (2) failed to deter terrorist action, and 
(3) tied the hands of the political branches with regard to the diplomatic 
relations of the United States. This problem is likely to become 
increasingly critical today, in a time when the political atmosphere of the 
world is tenuous and the international opinion of the United States is a 
highly polarized concern.127 The very existence of a publicly declared War 
on Terror serves as a reminder that acts of terrorism continue to be a very 
real possibility. Continued reliance on civil liability as a means of 
compensation from state sponsors of terrorism is both inadequate for 
plaintiff-victims and potentially harmful to American diplomatic 
relations.128  
Therefore, the cause of action and exception to sovereign immunity 
contained in the AEDPA, the Flatow amendment, and successive 
amendments should be abrogated. Congress should consider alternative 
means of compensation, such as the fund established for victims of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, in seeking to establish a flexible but 
regularly-funded federal compensation program. With such a program in 
 127. See generally, Neely Tucker, Pain and Suffering; Relatives of Terrorist Victims Race Each 
Other to Court, but Justice and Money are Both Hard to Find, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at F1. 
 128. Several scholars and commentators have perceived the use of civil suits under the AEDPA as 
particularly dangerous in the current political climate. As Daveed Gartenstein-Ross explained in his 
critical note on the AEDPA, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, “the war against terrorism will be 
fought on both military and diplomatic fronts, and the terrorism exception could disrupt important, but 
already sensitive, relations.” Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 26, at 888. 
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place, victims could be compensated quickly and efficiently, and the goal 
of deterring terrorist acts could be accomplished by the executive and 
legislative branches through the use of military force, sanctions, or 
diplomacy. 
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